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ConceptEconomics

Separating equilibrium

An equilibrium in a signaling game where different types of the sender choose different actions, completely revealing their private type through their choice.
as Ian Ball defines itMITThe wording closest to all 4 definitions
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Named as a prerequisite by the lectures that define this. The number is how many say so. A grey one has no page yet.

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Concepts that name this one as a prerequisite.

Lecturers

3

Each in their own terms, from the easiest level.

  • Ian Ball

    MIT · Undergraduate

    An equilibrium where different sender types choose different education levels, allowing the receiver to perfectly infer the sender's type.
  • Ben Polak

    Yale University · Undergraduate

    An equilibrium in a signaling game where different types of agents choose different actions, allowing observers to perfectly distinguish their types from their choices.
    • 52:14Asymmetric Information: Signaling and Information Unraveling
  • Jonathan Gruber

    MIT · Undergraduate

    An equilibrium where different types of buyers choose different insurance products tailored to their risk levels.
    • 34:02Social Insurance Theory

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10

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3 lecturers. Definitions are written by AI from each lecture’s transcript. A time with a play mark starts the lecture at the moment the lecturer says it.