Chapter 1 of 9: Before the lecture
Ball builds Spence's signaling model, with indifference curves bounding the education that sustains separation.
Job-market signaling, modeled by Michael Spence in 1973, shows how workers use costly education to reveal private information about productivity. Ball begins with the general sender-receiver game, motivated by luxury goods, peacock feathers and the college wage premium. The formal model has low and high types, continuous education with type-dependent cost, and a competitive employer paying expected productivity. Education adds nothing to output and acts purely as a signal. Using sender optimality and Bayesian beliefs, Ball constructs pooling equilibria, then separating equilibria, with indifference curves in wage-education space marking the bounds; basic game theory and expected utility are assumed.
Job-market signaling, modeled by Michael Spence in 1973, shows how workers use costly education to reveal private information about productivity. Ball begins with the general sender-receiver game, motivated by luxury goods, peacock feathers and the college wage premium. The formal model has low and high types, continuous education with type-dependent cost, and a competitive employer paying expected productivity. Education adds nothing to output and acts purely as a signal. Using sender optimality and Bayesian beliefs, Ball constructs pooling equilibria, then separating equilibria, with indifference curves in wage-education space marking the bounds; basic game theory and expected utility are assumed.
Job-market Signaling
This lecture
Lecture 22 of 25 of Economic Applications of Game Theory.
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