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Subgame perfect equilibrium: Matchmaking and strategic investments

Ben PolakYale University

Professor

1:17:09·2008·undergraduate level

We analyze three games using our new solution concept, subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE). The first game involves players' trusting that others will not make mistakes.

EconomicsGame Theory & Mechanism DesignBackwardInductionBattle

This course was recorded in Fall 2007.

Source: YaleCourses via YouTubeWatch on YouTube
LecturerAll lecturers →
Ben Polak

Professor

Ben Polak is the William C. Brainard Professor of Economics at Yale University, known for his expertise in game theory and its applications in economic decision-making.

1 course · 22 lecturesCanon
Previous · Lecture 18

Imperfect Information: Information Sets and Sub-game Perfection

Next · Lecture 20

Subgame Perfect Equilibrium: Wars of Attrition

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