Skip to content
lectern.tv
Study notebook

Press N to jot a timestamped note or B to pin a moment while watching.

Who Gets What — and Why: Market Design and Kidney Exchange

Alvin E. RothStanford University

Craig and Susan McCaw Professor of Economics, Stanford University

1:22:05·2013·introductory level·Public Colloquium

Shows how deferred-acceptance matching algorithms redesign markets where prices cannot clear—including medical residency matching, public school choice, and paired kidney transplants.

EconomicsGame Theory & Mechanism DesignAlgorithms & Data Structuresal rothnobel prize

November 14, 2013. Dr. Alvin Roth, Craig and Susan McCaw Professor of Economics at Stanford University and 2012 Nobel laureate in economics. Dr. Roth discusses his work in mechanism design over the last several years. Q&A Begins at: 1'01'14″.

To get the book Crisis of Crowding:

Source: Ludwig Chincarini via YouTubeWatch on YouTube
LecturerAll lecturers →
Alvin E. Roth

Craig and Susan McCaw Professor of Economics, Stanford University

1 lectureCanon

Comments

Add a comment...Sign in