Chapter 1 of 7: Before the lecture
Derives moral hazard and adverse selection models of lending, then shows how Karlan and Zinman tell them apart.
Credit markets in developing countries depart from the neoclassical benchmark, where risk-adjusted interest rates are equal and capital flows to its highest marginal product. Olken, teaching session 24 of MIT's Development Economics course, opens by closing out labor markets, including workplace safety evidence from Bangladesh's apparel sector. He then derives a moral hazard model in which limited liability pushes borrowers toward riskier projects as rates rise, and traces its equilibrium to possible market collapse. An adverse selection model follows, with fixed borrower types sorted by the interest rate. Monitoring costs, drawing on Aleem (1989), explain high microfinance rates, and Karlan and Zinman's ex-post discount experiment separates the two frictions.
Credit markets in developing countries depart from the neoclassical benchmark, where risk-adjusted interest rates are equal and capital flows to its highest marginal product. Olken, teaching session 24 of MIT's Development Economics course, opens by closing out labor markets, including workplace safety evidence from Bangladesh's apparel sector. He then derives a moral hazard model in which limited liability pushes borrowers toward riskier projects as rates rise, and traces its equilibrium to possible market collapse. An adverse selection model follows, with fixed borrower types sorted by the interest rate. Monitoring costs, drawing on Aleem (1989), explain high microfinance rates, and Karlan and Zinman's ex-post discount experiment separates the two frictions.
Carranza et al (2020)
Wheeler et al (2021)
Alfonsi et al (2020)
The Jungle
Boudreau 2020
Aleem (1989)
This lecture
Lecture 24 of 25 of Development Economics.
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Observing Unobservables: Identifying Information Asymmetries with a Consumer Credit Field Experiment