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The Badness of Death, Part II: The Deprivation Account

Shelly KaganDistinguishedYale University

Professor

51:37·2008·introductory level

This lecture details the "deprivation account" of death's badness, asserting that ceasing to exist deprives one of life's good things. It distinguishes intrinsic badness from comparative badness, engaging with Epicurus's views.

PhilosophyMetaphysics, Mind & MortalityBadness of deathDeprivation accountEpicurean philosophy

This lecture continues to explore the issue of why death may be bad. According to the deprivation account, what is bad about death is the fact that because one ceases to exist, one becomes deprived of the good things in life. Being dead is not intrinsically bad; it is comparatively bad and one is worse off only by virtue of not being able to enjoy the things one enjoyed while alive, such as watching the sunset, listening to music, and discussing philosophy.

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Shelly KaganDistinguished

Author of "Death" · Yale University

Shelly Kagan is a Professor of Philosophy at Yale University, widely recognized for his influential work in normative and applied ethics, particularly on the topic of death.

1 course · 22 lecturesCanon
Previous · Lecture 16

Dying Alone; The Badness of Death, Part I

Next · Lecture 18

The Badness of Death, Part III; Immortality, Part I

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