Ben Polak
William C. Brainard Professor of Economics at Yale University · Yale University
Ben Polak is the William C. Brainard Professor of Economics at Yale University, a game theorist who served as Yale's Provost from 2013 to 2017.
- lectures
- 24
- series
- 1
- hours
- 29
Start here
Series and courses
Yale ECON 159: Game Theory
Open the course
- 1Introduction: Five first lessons
- 2Putting yourselves into other people's shoes
- 3Iterative deletion and the median-voter theorem
- 4Best responses in soccer and business partnerships
Show 20 moreShow fewer
- 5Nash Equilibrium: Bad fashion and bank runs
- 6Nash Equilibrium: Dating and Cournot
- 7Nash Equilibrium: Shopping, standing and voting on a line
- 8Nash Equilibrium: Location, segregation and randomization
- 9Mixed Strategies in Theory and Tennis
- 10Mixed Strategies in Baseball, Dating, and Paying Your Taxes
- 11Evolutionary Stability: Cooperation, Mutation, and Equilibrium
- 12Evolutionary Stability: Social Convention, Aggression, and Cycles
- 13Sequential Games: Moral Hazard, Incentives, and Hungry Lions
- 14Backward Induction: Commitment, Spies, and First-Mover Advantages
- 15Backward Induction: Chess, Strategies, and Credible Threats
- 16Backward Induction: Reputation and Duels
- 17Backward Induction: Ultimatums and Bargaining
- 18Imperfect Information: Information Sets and Sub-game Perfection
- 19Subgame perfect equilibrium: Matchmaking and strategic investments
- 20Subgame Perfect Equilibrium: Wars of Attrition
- 21Repeated Games: Cooperation vs. The End Game
- 22Repeated Games: Cheating, Punishment, and Outsourcing
- 23Asymmetric Information: Signaling and Information Unraveling
- 24Asymmetric Information: Auctions and the Winner's Curse
In these lectures
- Do not play a strictly dominated strategy.Introduction: Five first lessons
- Zermelo's theorem guarantees that any finite two-player game of perfect information has a solution where either player one forces a win, player one forces a tie, or player two forces a win.Backward Induction: Chess, Strategies, and Credible Threats
- A strategy that is never a best response to any belief should be eliminated from consideration.Best responses in soccer and business partnerships
Draws on
People cited in the lectures, at the moment of the citation.
- Joe JacksonPop star cited for the lyric 'you can't get what you want unless you know what you want'.
- Zermelo's theoremErnst Zermelo, cited for his theorem on finite zero-sum games.
- Thomas SchellingNobel laureate whose models of segregation and tipping points are discussed.
- Maynard Smith1970s economist/biologist cited for foundational ideas on evolutionary game theory.
- John Maynard SmithCited as originating evolutionary stability in biology, though the lecturer notes it originates from Darwin.
- Charles DarwinCited as the true originator of the 19th-century biological idea of evolution.
About
Ben Polak is the William C. Brainard Professor of Economics at Yale University, a game theorist who served as Yale's Provost from 2013 to 2017. His undergraduate course ECON 159 runs from Nash equilibrium and mixed strategies through Zermelo's theorem, repeated prisoner's dilemmas and evolutionary stability.
Same subject, Economics & Finance
Connections
31Their places, courses, books and lectures.
Course1
Concept1
Lectures24
- Introduction: Five first lessons
- Backward Induction: Chess, Strategies, and Credible Threats
- Best responses in soccer and business partnerships
- Repeated Games: Cheating, Punishment, and Outsourcing
- Mixed Strategies in Baseball, Dating, and Paying Your Taxes
- Repeated Games: Cooperation vs. The End Game
Show 18 moreShow fewer
- Nash Equilibrium: Location, segregation and randomization
- Putting yourselves into other people's shoes
- Evolutionary Stability: Cooperation, Mutation, and Equilibrium
- Backward Induction: Reputation and Duels
- Mixed Strategies in Theory and Tennis
- Nash Equilibrium: Bad fashion and bank runs
- Sequential Games: Moral Hazard, Incentives, and Hungry Lions
- Backward Induction: Commitment, Spies, and First-Mover Advantages
- Subgame Perfect Equilibrium: Wars of Attrition
- Imperfect Information: Information Sets and Sub-game Perfection
- Evolutionary Stability: Social Convention, Aggression, and Cycles
- Iterative deletion and the median-voter theorem
- Nash Equilibrium: Dating and Cournot
- Asymmetric Information: Signaling and Information Unraveling
- Subgame perfect equilibrium: Matchmaking and strategic investments
- Backward Induction: Ultimatums and Bargaining
- Asymmetric Information: Auctions and the Winner's Curse
- Nash Equilibrium: Shopping, standing and voting on a line


