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Nash Equilibrium: Dating and Cournot

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Nash Equilibrium: Dating and Cournot

Ben PolakYale University

William C. Brainard Professor of Economics

1:12:06·2008·undergraduate level
Path step 3: Extends equilibrium reasoning to Cournot competition and strategic pricing.

This lecture formally defines and applies the Nash Equilibrium concept to classic coordination games, including the Battle of the Sexes. It then presents a rigorous mathematical analysis of the Cournot duopoly model, examining firm competition and welfare implications.

EconomicsGame Theory & Mechanism DesignNash EquilibriumCoordination GamesCournot Competition

We apply the notion of Nash Equilibrium, first, to some more coordination games; in particular, the Battle of the Sexes. Then we analyze the classic Cournot model of imperfect competition between firms. We consider the difficulties in colluding in such settings, and we discuss the welfare consequences of the Cournot equilibrium as compared to monopoly and perfect competition.

This course was recorded in Fall 2007.

Source: YaleCourses via YouTubeWatch on YouTube
LecturerAll lecturers →
Ben Polak

Professor

Ben Polak is the William C. Brainard Professor of Economics at Yale University, known for his expertise in game theory and its applications in economic decision-making.

1 course · 22 lecturesCanon
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Nash Equilibrium: Bad fashion and bank runs

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Behavioral Evolution I — Prisoner's Dilemma & Kin Selection

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