Lecture 1: Introduction to Individual Decision-Making (14.12)
57:16Lecture 2: Representation of Games (14.12)
1:13:14Lecture 3: Dominance (14.12)
1:16:26Lecture 4: Rationalizability (14.12)
1:21:50Lecture 5: Nash Equilibrium (14.12)
1:19:27Lecture 6: Imperfect Competition (14.12)
1:20:30Lecture 7: Zero-Sum Games (14.12)
1:20:39Lecture 8: Backward Induction (14.12)
1:17:06Lecture 9: Negotiation (14.12)
1:13:34Lecture 10: Subgame-Perfect Nash Equilibrium (14.12)
1:20:41Lecture 11: One-Shot Deviation Principle and Bargaining (14.12)
1:18:29Lecture 12: Finitely Repeated Games (14.12)
1:17:09Lecture 13: Infinitely Repeated Games (14.12)
1:22:18Lecture 14: Folk Theorem (14.12)
1:17:38Lecture 15: Implicit Cartels (14.12)
1:21:18Lecture 16: Bayesian Games (14.12)
1:21:15Lecture 17: Bayesian Nash Equilibrium: Applications (14.12)
1:09:47Lecture 18: Auctions (14.12)
1:19:23Lecture 19: Revenue Equivalence (14.12)
1:20:20Lecture 20: Ad Auctions (14.12)
1:16:04Lecture 17: Bayesian Nash Equilibrium: Applications (14.12)
This session extends the discussion of Bayesian Nash Equilibrium, applying it to practical economic scenarios. Specific applications include Cournot competition under asymmetric information and the strategic design of auctions.
MIT 14.12 Economic Applications of Game Theory, Fall 2025
Instructor: Ian Ball
View the complete course: https://ocw.mit.edu/courses/14-12-economic-applications-of-game-theory-fall-2025/
YouTube Playlist: https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLUl4u3cNGP63quuKvMHCt3cmTmt0O2qpv
Lecture 16: Bayesian Games (14.12)
Next · Lecture 18Lecture 18: Auctions (14.12)
