Opening Evolutionary Game Theory: Fighting and Contests
Evolutionary Game Theory: Fighting and Contests
- Length
- 45 min
- Level
- Undergraduate
- Recorded
- Yale University2009
Chapter 1 of 6: Evolutionary game theory fundamentals
Solves the Hawk-Dove payoff matrix for a mixed stable strategy, then tests it on bowl and doily spiders and red deer.
Evolutionary game theory gives Stearns a way to model frequency-dependent behavior, where the fitness of a strategy depends on what the rest of the population does. Starting from von Neumann, Morgenstern and Maynard Smith, he defines an evolutionarily stable strategy as one no rare mutant can invade. The Hawk-Dove payoff matrix shows that a mixed strategy evolves when the cost of injury exceeds the reward of victory. The Prisoner's Dilemma then shows how short-term selfishness drives defection, and how repeated encounters allow cooperation. Bowl and doily spiders, Harris sparrows and red deer illustrate asymmetric contests, honest signals and assessment before a closing critique of the models' assumptions.
Evolutionary game theory gives Stearns a way to model frequency-dependent behavior, where the fitness of a strategy depends on what the rest of the population does. Starting from von Neumann, Morgenstern and Maynard Smith, he defines an evolutionarily stable strategy as one no rare mutant can invade. The Hawk-Dove payoff matrix shows that a mixed strategy evolves when the cost of injury exceeds the reward of victory. The Prisoner's Dilemma then shows how short-term selfishness drives defection, and how repeated encounters allow cooperation. Bowl and doily spiders, Harris sparrows and red deer illustrate asymmetric contests, honest signals and assessment before a closing critique of the models' assumptions.
Theory of Games and Economic Behavior
Evolutionary Games and Social Behaviour / similar title by John Maynard Smith
Evolution and the Theory of Games
This lecture
Lecture 33 of 36 of Principles of Evolution, Ecology, and Behavior.
Choose a node to see how it connects to this lecture. What comes before is on the leftat the top. What comes after is on the rightat the bottom. The ring is what it teaches. People and places are above. Other lectures and books are below.
Press a chosen node again to open it.
Your comment is kept while you sign up.Sign in
Austad (1983)
Status signaling in Harris sparrows: some experiments in deception
The roaring of red deer and the evolution of honest communication