ConceptEconomics
Nash equilibrium
A strategy profile where each player's strategy is an optimal response to the strategies of all other players.
Know first
Named as a prerequisite by the lectures that define this. The number is how many say so. A grey one has no page yet.
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Concepts that name this one as a prerequisite.
Lecturers
7Each in their own terms, from the easiest level.
Ben Polak
A profile of strategies such that each player's strategy is an optimal response to the strategies chosen by all other players.Ian Ball
Jonathan Gruber
The point at which no player wants to change their strategy given what the other players are doing.Robert Sapolsky
The optimal solution to behavior where no player has an incentive to change their strategy unilaterally.David Silver
A joint policy for all players where every single player is playing the best response to everyone else.Michael I. Jordan
A final game state where no player benefits from changing their strategy.Sergey Levine
A solution concept of a non-cooperative game where no player has an incentive to unilaterally change their action.
Lectures that assume it
30The first 12 are shown.
- Nash Equilibrium: Location, segregation and randomization
- Mixed Strategies in Theory and Tennis
- Mixed Strategies in Baseball, Dating, and Paying Your Taxes
- Repeated Games: Cheating, Punishment, and Outsourcing
- Subgame-Perfect Nash Equilibrium
- Evolutionary Game Theory: Fighting and Contests
- Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
- Evolutionary Stability: Cooperation, Mutation, and Equilibrium
- Introduction: Five first lessons
- Backward Induction: Reputation and Duels
- Subgame Perfect Equilibrium: Wars of Attrition
- Imperfect Competition
Connections
57The lectures that define it or assume it, and the concepts next to it.
Concepts10
Lectures47
- Backward Induction: Chess, Strategies, and Credible Threats
- Repeated Games: Cooperation vs. The End Game
- Backward Induction
- Best responses in soccer and business partnerships
- Oligopoly
- Nash Equilibrium
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- Behavioral Evolution I — Prisoner's Dilemma & Kin Selection
- Imperfect Information: Information Sets and Sub-game Perfection
- Nash Equilibrium: Bad fashion and bank runs
- A Collectivist, Economic Perspective on AI Systems
- Classic Games
- Nash Equilibrium: Shopping, standing and voting on a line
- Nash Equilibrium: Dating and Cournot
- Public Goods Theory, Optimality, and Pricing
- Policy Gradient Methods
- Exploration of advanced topics in deep reinforcement learning
- Aggression IV
- Nash Equilibrium: Location, segregation and randomization
- Mixed Strategies in Theory and Tennis
- Mixed Strategies in Baseball, Dating, and Paying Your Taxes
- Repeated Games: Cheating, Punishment, and Outsourcing
- Subgame-Perfect Nash Equilibrium
- Evolutionary Game Theory: Fighting and Contests
- Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
- Evolutionary Stability: Cooperation, Mutation, and Equilibrium
- Introduction: Five first lessons
- Backward Induction: Reputation and Duels
- Subgame Perfect Equilibrium: Wars of Attrition
- Imperfect Competition
- Finitely Repeated Games
- Implicit Cartels
- Cheap Talk
- Evolutionary Stability: Social Convention, Aggression, and Cycles
- Negotiation
- Infinitely Repeated Games
- Folk Theorem
- How Can Robots Learn to Interact and Coordinate with Others?
- Bargaining with Incomplete Information
- Subgame perfect equilibrium: Matchmaking and strategic investments
- One-Shot Deviation Principle and Bargaining
- Zero-Sum Games
- Bayesian Games
- Agreement and Alignment for Human-AI Collaborative Decision Making
- The Origin and Maintenance of Genetic Variation
- Nobel Lecture: Auction Theory and Practical Market Design
- Rationalizability
- Zero-Sum Games