Constitutional Structure, Strategic Incentives & Public Finance
Written text, unwritten constitutional norms, game-theoretic dominance, and externalities
Brings Yale Law School's Akhil Reed Amar into conversation with MIT Economics (Muhamet Yildiz and Jonathan Gruber) on how constitutional rules and fiscal institutions align incentives.
Curriculum sequence
6
Course Introduction: Reading America's Written Constitution (LAW-CONST1)
Introduces textual and structural methods for reading the U.S. Constitution as an institutional blueprint.
Congressional Powers, Part 1 (LAW-CONST1)
Examines enumerated legislative powers and federal fiscal authority under Article I.
Reading Between the Lines, Part 1 (LAW-CONST2)
Shows how unwritten conventions, structural inference, and historical practice complete written text.
Lecture 1: Introduction to Individual Decision-Making (14.12)
Formalizes rational choice under uncertainty and strategic interdependence.
Lecture 01: Why Study Public Finance? (14.41)
Defines when state intervention improves welfare over decentralized market outcomes.
Lecture 02: Externalities in Theory (14.41)
Models Pigouvian taxation and Coasean bargaining in the presence of production and consumption externalities.