Chapter 1 of 9: Cheap talk in game theory
Shows why a biased sender cannot fully reveal the state, then builds Crawford-Sobel partitional equilibria cell by cell.
Cheap talk in game theory examines how a privately informed sender with biased preferences communicates with an uninformed decision-maker using costless messages. The lecture introduces the Crawford-Sobel model of strategic information transmission, demonstrating that perfect communication is impossible when a conflict of interest exists. It proceeds to analyze partitional equilibria, where the state space is divided into discrete intervals that provide coarse information to the receiver. The analysis establishes that the precision of communication depends on the magnitude of the sender's bias relative to the threshold constraints.
Cheap talk in game theory examines how a privately informed sender with biased preferences communicates with an uninformed decision-maker using costless messages. The lecture introduces the Crawford-Sobel model of strategic information transmission, demonstrating that perfect communication is impossible when a conflict of interest exists. It proceeds to analyze partitional equilibria, where the state space is divided into discrete intervals that provide coarse information to the receiver. The analysis establishes that the precision of communication depends on the magnitude of the sender's bias relative to the threshold constraints.
Strategic Information Transmission
Crawford & Sobel (1982)
This lecture
Lecture 24 of 25 of Economic Applications of Game Theory.
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