Chapter 1 of 9: VCG auction for two items
Ball derives pooling and separating equilibria in an admissions game where optional essays signal type.
Perfect Bayesian equilibrium is the solution concept for dynamic games in which players must hold beliefs about moves they cannot observe. Ball opens session 21 of MIT 14.12 by finishing a Vickrey–Clarke–Groves auction for two items, showing why truthful bidding is optimal. An entry deterrence game then shows subgame perfection removing non-credible threats, and losing force once entry actions share one information set. In an applicant-school game, nature assigns private types and the school admits after seeing whether an optional essay was written. Ball defines assessments through sequential rationality and consistent beliefs, then derives pooling and separating equilibria whose incentive constraints bound the essay cost.
Perfect Bayesian equilibrium is the solution concept for dynamic games in which players must hold beliefs about moves they cannot observe. Ball opens session 21 of MIT 14.12 by finishing a Vickrey–Clarke–Groves auction for two items, showing why truthful bidding is optimal. An entry deterrence game then shows subgame perfection removing non-credible threats, and losing force once entry actions share one information set. In an applicant-school game, nature assigns private types and the school admits after seeing whether an optional essay was written. Ball defines assessments through sequential rationality and consistent beliefs, then derives pooling and separating equilibria whose incentive constraints bound the essay cost.
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Lecture 21 of 25 of Economic Applications of Game Theory.
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