Lecture 1: Introduction to Individual Decision-Making (14.12)
57:16Lecture 2: Representation of Games (14.12)
1:13:14Lecture 3: Dominance (14.12)
1:16:26Lecture 4: Rationalizability (14.12)
1:21:50Lecture 5: Nash Equilibrium (14.12)
1:19:27Lecture 6: Imperfect Competition (14.12)
1:20:30Lecture 7: Zero-Sum Games (14.12)
1:20:39Lecture 8: Backward Induction (14.12)
1:17:06Lecture 9: Negotiation (14.12)
1:13:34Lecture 10: Subgame-Perfect Nash Equilibrium (14.12)
1:20:41Lecture 11: One-Shot Deviation Principle and Bargaining (14.12)
1:18:29Lecture 12: Finitely Repeated Games (14.12)
1:17:09Lecture 13: Infinitely Repeated Games (14.12)
1:22:18Lecture 14: Folk Theorem (14.12)
1:17:38Lecture 15: Implicit Cartels (14.12)
1:21:18Lecture 16: Bayesian Games (14.12)
1:21:15Lecture 17: Bayesian Nash Equilibrium: Applications (14.12)
1:09:47Lecture 18: Auctions (14.12)
1:19:23Lecture 19: Revenue Equivalence (14.12)
1:20:20Lecture 20: Ad Auctions (14.12)
1:16:04Lecture 14: Folk Theorem (14.12)
This lecture formalizes the Folk Theorem, which posits that in infinitely repeated games, any individually rational and feasible payoff can be sustained as a Nash equilibrium. It highlights the vast range of possible cooperative and punitive strategies.
MIT 14.12 Economic Applications of Game Theory, Fall 2025
Instructor: Ian Ball
View the complete course: https://ocw.mit.edu/courses/14-12-economic-applications-of-game-theory-fall-2025/
YouTube Playlist: https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLUl4u3cNGP63quuKvMHCt3cmTmt0O2qpv
Lecture 13: Infinitely Repeated Games (14.12)
Next · Lecture 15Lecture 15: Implicit Cartels (14.12)