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MIT 14.12: Economic Applications of Game Theory →0/20
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Lecture 1: Introduction to Individual Decision-Making (14.12)

57:16
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Lecture 2: Representation of Games (14.12)

1:13:14
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Lecture 3: Dominance (14.12)

1:16:26
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Lecture 4: Rationalizability (14.12)

1:21:50
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Lecture 5: Nash Equilibrium (14.12)

1:19:27
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Lecture 6: Imperfect Competition (14.12)

1:20:30
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Lecture 7: Zero-Sum Games (14.12)

1:20:39
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Lecture 8: Backward Induction (14.12)

1:17:06
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Lecture 9: Negotiation (14.12)

1:13:34
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Lecture 10: Subgame-Perfect Nash Equilibrium (14.12)

1:20:41
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Lecture 11: One-Shot Deviation Principle and Bargaining (14.12)

1:18:29
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Lecture 12: Finitely Repeated Games (14.12)

1:17:09
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Lecture 13: Infinitely Repeated Games (14.12)

1:22:18
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Lecture 14: Folk Theorem (14.12)

1:17:38
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Lecture 15: Implicit Cartels (14.12)

1:21:18
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Lecture 16: Bayesian Games (14.12)

1:21:15
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Lecture 17: Bayesian Nash Equilibrium: Applications (14.12)

1:09:47
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Lecture 18: Auctions (14.12)

1:19:23
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Lecture 19: Revenue Equivalence (14.12)

1:20:20
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Lecture 20: Ad Auctions (14.12)

1:16:04

Lecture 15: Implicit Cartels (14.12)

Ian BallMIT

Professor

1:21:18·2026·undergraduate level

Examining implicit cartels, this lecture explores how independent market participants can collaborate to dominate markets and improve profits without explicit agreements. OPEC serves as a classic economic illustration.

EconomicsGame Theory & Mechanism DesignImplicit CartelsCollusionMarket Dominance

MIT 14.12 Economic Applications of Game Theory, Fall 2025

Instructor: Ian Ball

View the complete course: https://ocw.mit.edu/courses/14-12-economic-applications-of-game-theory-fall-2025/

YouTube Playlist: https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLUl4u3cNGP63quuKvMHCt3cmTmt0O2qpv

Previous · Lecture 14

Lecture 14: Folk Theorem (14.12)

Next · Lecture 16

Lecture 16: Bayesian Games (14.12)

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