Chapter 1 of 12: Before the lecture
Solves a three-dollar ultimatum game by backward induction, then proves that chess has a value from the same algorithm.
Backward induction solves sequential games by reasoning from the last move of a game tree back to the first. Ball opens session 8 of MIT 14.12 with an ultimatum game played in class on Moblab, then solves a three-dollar version. Nash equilibrium tolerates suboptimal play at unreached contingencies, and a battle of the sexes with observed moves shows how backward induction rules out non-credible threats. Ball formalizes the algorithm for finite games of perfect information, proves each has a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium, and concludes that chess has a value. Stackelberg quantity competition closes the session, where threats to flood the market fail; Nash equilibrium and basic calculus are assumed.
Backward induction solves sequential games by reasoning from the last move of a game tree back to the first. Ball opens session 8 of MIT 14.12 with an ultimatum game played in class on Moblab, then solves a three-dollar version. Nash equilibrium tolerates suboptimal play at unreached contingencies, and a battle of the sexes with observed moves shows how backward induction rules out non-credible threats. Ball formalizes the algorithm for finite games of perfect information, proves each has a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium, and concludes that chess has a value. Stackelberg quantity competition closes the session, where threats to flood the market fail; Nash equilibrium and basic calculus are assumed.
This lecture
Lecture 3 of 5 of Economic Applications of Game Theory.
Choose a node to see how it connects to this lecture. What comes before is on the leftat the top. What comes after is on the rightat the bottom. The ring is what it teaches. People and places are above.
Press a chosen node again to open it.
Your comment is kept while you sign up.Sign in