Chapter 1 of 11: Introduction to Negotiation and Pre-trial Settlements
Solves a -period alternating-offer pre-trial game by backward induction; trial costs set the deal.
Pre-trial settlement between a plaintiff and a defendant is the first worked application of backward induction in MIT 14.12, session 9. Ball builds a stylized model with a known judgement amount, per-period legal costs, and 2n alternating offers that end in trial. Starting from period , he derives acceptance thresholds and offers, then generalizes them to all odd and even periods. Agreement comes at once in period zero, with each side's trial costs weakening its position. A second model of price haggling uses discounting instead and shows a first-mover advantage that vanishes as the discount factor nears one.
Pre-trial settlement between a plaintiff and a defendant is the first worked application of backward induction in MIT 14.12, session 9. Ball builds a stylized model with a known judgement amount, per-period legal costs, and 2n alternating offers that end in trial. Starting from period , he derives acceptance thresholds and offers, then generalizes them to all odd and even periods. Agreement comes at once in period zero, with each side's trial costs weakening its position. A second model of price haggling uses discounting instead and shows a first-mover advantage that vanishes as the discount factor nears one.

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Lecture 4 of 5 of Economic Applications of Game Theory.
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