Ian Ball
Professor · MIT
- lectures
- 25
- series
- 1
- hours
- 32
Start here
Series and courses
MIT 14.12: Economic Applications of Game Theory
Open the course
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- 5Nash Equilibrium
- 6Imperfect Competition
- 7Zero-Sum Games
- 8Backward Induction
- 9Negotiation
- 10Subgame-Perfect Nash Equilibrium
- 11One-Shot Deviation Principle and Bargaining
- 12Finitely Repeated Games
- 13Infinitely Repeated Games
- 14Folk Theorem
- 15Implicit Cartels
- 16Bayesian Games
- 17Bayesian Nash Equilibrium: Applications
- 18Auctions
- 19Revenue Equivalence
- 20Ad Auctions
- 21Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
- 22Signaling
- 23Bargaining with Incomplete Information
- 24Cheap Talk
- 25Common Knowledge
In these lectures
- A strategy in a Bayesian game must be a complete contingent plan that specifies an action for every possible mental state or type a player might hold.Bayesian Nash Equilibrium: Applications
- Subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium extends backward induction to handle games of imperfect information and infinite games.Subgame-Perfect Nash Equilibrium
- Backward induction works by starting at the end of an extensive-form game tree and reasoning backwards to the beginning.Backward Induction
Draws on
People cited in the lectures, at the moment of the citation.
- John NashWon the Nobel Prize in Economics; published foundational papers introducing the Nash equilibrium concept in 1948-1949.
- Paul MilgromCited for the quote 'the game is always larger than you think'.
- Jean-Jacques Rousseau1600s philosopher credited with describing the Stag Hunt game.
- Roger MyersonNobel laureate, cited for 1991 definition of game theory
- Robert AumannNobel laureate, cited for 1989 definition of game theory as interactive decision theory
- Drew FudenbergMIT professor, formalized a version of the Folk Theorem in a 1986 paper.
Playlists
8Taught with
Connections
28Their places, courses, books and lectures.
Institution1
Concept1
Lectures25
- Bayesian Nash Equilibrium: Applications
- Subgame-Perfect Nash Equilibrium
- Backward Induction
- Auctions
- Nash Equilibrium
- Implicit Cartels
Show 19 moreShow fewer
- Imperfect Competition
- Finitely Repeated Games
- Revenue Equivalence
- Introduction to Individual Decision-Making
- Infinitely Repeated Games
- Folk Theorem
- Negotiation
- Representation of Games
- Dominance
- One-Shot Deviation Principle and Bargaining
- Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
- Zero-Sum Games
- Cheap Talk
- Ad Auctions
- Signaling
- Bayesian Games
- Rationalizability
- Bargaining with Incomplete Information
- Common Knowledge








